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REEVALUATING THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
CHRISTINE HARRINGTON
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001 and 2002, the financial world was racked by a series of
corporate scandals. One after another, Enron, Worldcom, and
other publicly traded companies, were revealed to have engaged in
widespread fraudulent conduct, costing investors and others in the
billions and billions of dollars.' As information of the improprieties
came to light, it raised the possibility that some lawyers represent-
ing these companies were engaged directly in the wrongdoing.
2
Many other lawyers apparently stood silently by even though they
presumably had extensive knowledge of corporate wrongdoing and
could have prevented these staggering losses. Under the American
Bar Association (ABA) rules governing legal ethics, not only did
these lawyers not have a duty to disclose this wrongdoing, they were
affirmatively prohibited from doing so.
3
Just a short while earlier, the ABA had had the opportunity but
chose not to expand the exception to the duty of confidentiality to
permit disclosures to prevent financial harm. In mid-1997, the ABA
created the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct (Ethics 2000 Commission) to reconsider the Model Rules
Of Professional Conduct.4 One of the major topics the ABA charged
the Commission with addressing was the lawyer's duty of confidenti-
ality.5 The Commission proposed changes to the rule governing
confidentiality that would expand the number of permissible disclo-
1. Floyd Norris, Enron's Collapse: News Analysis; For Andersen and Enron, the Ques-
tions Just Keep Coming, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at Cl; Rebecca Blumenstein, Worldcom
Group's Profit Slides 85 %. MCI Swings into Loss, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2001, at B2.
2. Amended Complaint, Newby v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3624 (S.D. Tex. filed
Apr. 8, 2002).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b) (1998) (amended 2002).
4. ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, ABA, Creation of the Commission: Executive Summary, at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-exec-summ.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (on file
with the New York Law School Law Review).
5. Id.
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sures. 6 The proposed Rule would have allowed for disclosure to
prevent "substantial bodily harm or death" to third parties, regard-
less of the action's criminality.7 It also permitted attorneys to dis-
close client information when there was a risk of "substantial
financial harm" to third parties.
8
The ABA House of Delegates voted to accept the proposal that
would allow disclosure to prevent bodily harm in August 2001 and
formally ratified the proposal in February 2002.9 The House of Del-
egates overwhelmingly rejected the proposal to allow disclosure to
prevent economic harm. 10
This Note argues that disclosure of client information to pre-
vent economic harm resulting from illegal or fraudulent conduct
should be permitted in the corporate client context.II In particular,
it argues that the traditional values that underlie the duty of confi-
dentiality have less weight in the corporate context. Part II of this
Note examines the traditional justifications for the duty. It also dis-
cusses the historical development of the duty of confidentiality. Part
III explores the Ethics 2000 Commission and the reasons for its cre-
ation. It further analyzes the changes that have been suggested and
were approved to the ABA rule governing confidentiality. Part IV
argues that the traditional justifications are not as compelling when
dealing with a corporate client, as opposed to an individual client.
Therefore, a different standard of confidentiality should be applied
in the context of the attorney/corporate-client relationship. In July
2002, the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility recom-
mended that the ABA recognize an exception to the duty of confi-
dentiality to prevent substantial economic harm to third parties
6. ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, ABA, Model Rule 1.6:Reporter's Explanation of Changes,
at http://abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel6rem.html (last visited Oct. 24 2003).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6(b) (1) (2002).
8. ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, ABA, Model Rule 1.6:Reporter's Explanation of Changes,
at http://abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule]6rem.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
9. Mark Hansen, Hot Off the Press: Revised Model Ethics Rules Are Nearly Ready for
State Scrutiny, 88 A.B.A.J. 38 (June 2002).
10. Al Swanson, ABA Ethics Debate Stalls, UNITED PRESS INT'L, August 7, 2001.
11. When addressing corporate clients this note presupposes that the corporate
client is a publicly traded company. Although the arguments for the distinction be-
tween corporate and individual clients can be made for private companies as well, for




from a client's illegal or fraudulent activity. 12 Thus, the ABA should
seize this opportunity to permit such disclosures in the context of
corporate representation.
13
II. HISTORY AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The duty of confidentiality has been a basic dimension of the
attorney-client relationship since its inception in England. 14 It has
long been considered a cornerstone of the attorney-client relation-
ship. 15 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, approved by the ABA
in 1983, state a general prohibition against disclosing client infor-
mation: 'A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the repre-
sentation of a client."1 6 The Model Rules cite two related bodies of
law as the source for this duty: the attorney-client privilege, which
applies in the evidentiary setting, and the ethical rules, which apply
generally.' 7 This ethical obligation requires the "lawyer to hold in-
violate confidential information of the client." ' This section will
explore the traditional justifications for the duty. It will also trace
how the duty evolved in the history of the bar's regulation of
lawyers.
A. Traditional Justifications
Throughout the history of the attorney-client relationship, dif-
ferent rationales have been advanced tojustify the duty of confiden-
tiality. The primary justifications that have been advanced in legal
scholarship and sources are: the duty of confidentiality as instru-
mental to the workings of the adversarial system, the duty as an out-
12. James H. Cheek, ABA, Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task
Force on Corporate Responsibility, July 16, 2002, 58 Bus. LAw. 189 (2002).
13. The Task Force suggested that the ABA make disclosure mandatory, rather
than permissive, in response to fraudulent or illegal activity by a client. The Task Force
suggested making the disclosure mandatory because the reasons for allowing disclosure
are so strong that it concluded disclosure should be mandatory. Of course, this is not
suggesting that lawyers impose moral judgments on the legitimate business actions of
their clients, such as hostile takeovers which may produce substantial economic harm to
someone or disclosing that a client plans on writing down its profits in its quarterly
reports.
14. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, §6.1.1, at 242 (1986).
15. Id.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (a) (1998) (amended 2002).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 5 (1998) (amended 2002).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (1998) (amended 2002).
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growth of the lawyer's duty of loyalty, and confidentiality as
necessary to preserve constitutional rights in the criminal arena. 19
The duty has been justified as playing an instrumental role in
the adversarial system. 20 Under this rationale, clients need to "com-
municate fully and frankly with the lawyer." 21 The free flow of in-
formation allows an attorney to consider the issues of a particular
client's case in an informed, intelligent manner. Complete knowl-
edge of the facts enables a lawyer to provide the appropriate legal
assistance. 2
2
Not only does full disclosure by a client in anticipation of confi-
dentiality assist a lawyer in acting as an advocate, it also allows a
lawyer to act as an advisor. 23 Therefore, knowledge of particular
facts provide the lawyer with a more informed basis to advise the
client on how to comply with the law.
A second justification for the duty of confidentiality is that it is
required by a lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client.24 As an agent of
a client, a lawyer has a fiduciary duty to the client that requires him
to keep sensitive information secret.25 Lawyers, even more so than
the typical agent, are privileged to "embarrassing or legally damag-
ing subject matter,"26 which a client would not normally be willing
to disclose: "Clients trust their lawyers, and lawyers want to deserve
that trust. '27 The lawyer's role has been defined as that of a "spe-
cial purpose friend" to the client.28 This role has become increas-
19. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 192-197
(1988); MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 1-5 (1975).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (1998) (amended 2002).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 4 (1998) (amended 2002).
22. See FREEDMAN, supra note 19, 1-8. Freedman uses the illustration of a woman
who kills her husband in what would constitute self-defense. Without complete disclo-
sure to the lawyer she may never know she has this defense. Id. at 4-5.
23. Id. at 4-8.
24. See LUBAN, supra note 19, at 185-189. Luban argues that "in ordinary circum-
stances, a lawyer must keep the client's confidences as a matter of elemental decency,
just as we must keep the confidences of a friend." Id. at 186.
25. WOLFRAM, supra note 14, §6.1.1.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 4. (1998) (amended 2002).
27. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 186.
28. Charles Fried, Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Rela-
tion, 85 YALE L. J. 1060 (1976). Fried uses the friend metaphor to reject a utilitarian
theory that a lawyer should promote general societal benefit. Just as an individual pro-
motes the benefit of those close to him, a lawyer does the same for his client who has
become close to him as his "special purpose friend."
[Vol. 47
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ingly important during the last century, as a complex system of laws
have developed, which require legal expertise to navigate them.
29
The legal system recognizes the legal rights of the individual, and
consequently the system "must also create and support the specific
role of the legal friend."
30
The dignitary justification has increased force in the criminal
realm, where the attorney-client relationship is afforded special
protections. These protections provide the third rationale for the
duty of confidentiality in the criminal context. A lawyer's role as a
"special purpose friend" enables clients to exercise their rights
under the Constitution and preserves the associated human digni-
ties.31 Confidentiality is essential to a lawyer's fulfillment of this role
and a client's vindication of these rights. 32 In particular, confiden-
tiality serves to safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to effective assis-
tance of counsel.
3 3
The Fifth Amendment prevents the government from "com-
pel [ing the defendant] in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."' 34 The privilege against self-incrimination serves to bal-
ance the power between the accused and the state, and it limits the
chances of testimony being coerced. 35 It also lessens the possibility
of innocent defendants' being convicted for poor performance on
the stand.
36
29. See Mary C. Daly, Symposium: Executing The Wrong Person: The Professionals'Ethical
Dilemmas: To Betray Once? To Betray Twice? Reflections on Confidentiality, a Guilty Client, an
Innocent Condemned Man, and an Ethics-Minded Defense Counsel, 29 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1611,
1623-24 (1996).
30. Fried, supra note 28, at 1073.
31. See Lee Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty To Warn Clients About Limits On Confidenti-
ality, 39 CATH. U.L. REv. 441, 451-463 (1990).
32. FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 1-8.
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
35. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 26.03 (Fifth Ed.
2002). The privilege against self-incrimination predates the United States and has its
origins in English common law. It was originally believed to be a response to the
deplorable inquisitorial approach of religious persecution in England during the 16th
and 17th centuries. A more recent theory portrays the privilege as being part of the
switch to an adversarial system of justice in the end of the 18th century. SeeJohn H.
Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law,
92 MICH. L REv. 1047 (1994).
36. DRESSLER, supra note 35, § 26.
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The Sixth Amendment further guarantees the assistance of
counsel in presenting a defense in all criminal prosecutions. 37 The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel begins when the defendant is
formally charged.38 In U.S. v. Marion, the Supreme Court asserted
that its interpretation of the amendment as being "far from mere
formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary
criminal justice."
39
Basic moral principles of privacy, personal autonomy and
human dignity underlie both of these constitutional protections af-
forded to defendants in criminal proceedings. 40 Our criminal jus-
tice system is built on respect for the rights of the individual.41 One
of the results of this respect for the individual, as discussed above, is
that lawyers are required to take on this role with the necessary loy-
alty.4 2 The right to counsel preserves human dignity by providing
that "no person is required to stand alone against the awesome
power '43 of the state. It allows defendants to tell their story, even
though they do not personally have the skills to tell it in the appro-
priate legal context: "it gives voice to the legally mute. '44 The right
against self-incrimination prevents a person from being used "as the
means of his own destruction. '45 These two rights applied simulta-
neously can be considered a "legal right to compel [an] attorney's
silence. ' 46 Allowing an attorney to disclose confidential information
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). There is a Fifth Amendment right to
counsel, otherwise known as a Miranda right to counsel, which attaches earlier if the
suspect has been taken into custody for interrogation, but counsel's role there is only to
ensure that the suspect has the opportunity to assert his right against self-incrimination.
For further discussion of this distinction see Dressler, supra note 35, § 25.04, at 440.
39. U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
40. DRESSLER, supra note 35, at 467.
41. FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 2-6. Freedman asserts that the rights of the indi-
vidual are afforded more respect than the search for the truth. He argues that a num-
ber of individual rights are afforded protection even though they do not further the
search for truth, i.e. prohibitions against unlawful searches, the right against self-incrim-
ination, etc.
42. See Fried , supra note 28, and accompanying text.
43. FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 4.
44. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 193.
45. Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 892 (1995).
46. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 196. Luban uses Alan Donagan's discussion of moral
and legal rights, recognizing that the defendant may not have a moral right to compel
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would force the client to trade one right for the other; this essen-
tially denies a client one of the rights.
4 7
All three of the justifications have been invoked as a basis for
the duty of confidentiality. Each justification for the duty-as an
instrumental part of the adversarial system, as an outgrowth of the
lawyer's duty of loyalty, and as necessary to preserve constitutional
rights in the criminal arena-has been developed and clarified over
time. The evolution of these justifications has resulted in the ex-
pansion of the duty since the early 20th century.
48
B. Development of the Duty
As the traditional justifications have been clarified and have
become widely accepted, the duty of confidentiality has received
growing recognition as an important professional norm. Along with
this recognition, there has also been the articulation of competing
concerns that suggest, and may even require, limitations on the
duty. These competing concerns include potential harm to third
parties. 49 In an attempt to articulate a duty that serves the tradi-
tional justifications, while still heeding competing concerns, the
ABA's official pronouncements regarding the duty have been in-
consistent and confusing. The history of the duty of confidentiality
has been marred by self-contradiction.
The Canons
In 1908, the ABA adopted its first code of ethics, the Canons of
Professional Ethics.50 Canon 6 protected a client's "secrets or confi-
dences."51 In 1928, the Canons were amended to include Canon 37,
which explicitly stated that a lawyer was to "preserve the client's
the attorney's silence, but the attorney must remain silent to avoid the legal right from
being diminished.
47. Id.
48. See generally, MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 87-108
(MATTHEW BENDER 1990).
49. Another competing concern, which is not addressed in this note, is the law-
yer's role as an officer of the court. For an interesting discussion of the conflicts that
arise between the lawyer's role as officer of the court and duty of confidentiality see
Jocelyn N. Sands & Roy Conn, III, Note, Confidentiality and the Lauyer's Conflicting Duty,
27 How. L.J. 329 (1984).
50. FREEDMAN, supra note 48, at 87-108.
51. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 6 (1908).
2003]
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confidences." 52 Contradictions throughout the Canons soon be-
came apparent. 53 Although the Canons called for confidences to be
preserved, there were various Canons that required disclosure of
confidential information; Canon 37 had a "future crime" excep-
tion; Canon 15 prohibited "any manner of fraud or chicane"; Ca-
non 22 required candor to the tribunal; Canon 29 required perjury
to be disclosed to prosecuting authorities; and Canon 41 required
the lawyer to disclose fraud to the other party. 54 The differences
among these exceptions were ultimately resolved through a series
of ABA opinions, which sought to strike a balance between the duty
and competing concerns. Through these opinions, the ABA clari-
fied that confidentiality was required in many situations where the
language of the Canons arguably suggested otherwise. 55
The Code
In 1969, the ABA replaced the Canons with the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. The ambiguities surrounding confidential-
ity resurfaced again under the Code.56 Canon 4 of the Code stated
that a lawyer should "preserve the confidences and secrets of his
client."5 7 Ethical Consideration 4-1 further recognized that "proper
functioning of the legal system require[d] the preservation by the
lawyer of confidences."58 However, the duty of confidentiality
under the Code was not absolute, and it required disclosure in cer-
tain situations. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(b) (1) originally called for
the lawyer to reveal client fraud on third parties and the tribunal.59
It was later amended in 1974 to require disclosure "except when the
52. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 37 (1928).
53. FREEDMAN, supra note 48, at 91-92.
54. Id. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 37, Canon 15, Canon 22, Canon 29, Ca-
non 41 (1928).
55. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 778
(1964). The Committee called on a lawyer to urge the client to disclose in situations of
client fraud on third parties, but not to reveal.
56. FREEDMAN, supra note 48, at 93.
57. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1969). The Code contained
three types of assertions; Canons that set out general principles from which the Ethical
Consideration, objectives and aspirations of the profession, and Disciplinary Rules, the
minimum standard, were derived.
58. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981).
59. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(b)1 (1981).
[Vol. 47
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information is protected as a privileged communication." 60 ABA
Opinion 341 interpreted the new amendment as forbidding "the
lawyer to reveal the client's fraud on a tribunal or third party if to
do so would be 'embarrassing' to the client."61 With this interpreta-
tion the ABA reverted back to the same broad conception of confi-
dentiality that had applied under the Canons.62
The Model Rules
When the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
to replace the Code in 1983, the duty of confidentiality was a hotly
debated topic. 63 The ABA Commission that proposed the Model
Rules suggested a broader range of permitted exceptions to the duty
of confidentiality than had existed under the Code.64 Nevertheless,
the ABA eventually adopted a rule that only allowed disclosure in
limited circumstances to prevent harm to third parties: specifically
to prevent a crime that will "result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm."
65
The Commission, known as the "Kutak Commission," after its
chairman Robert Kutak, was convened in 1977 to respond to vari-
ous concerns within the legal profession. 66 The first concern in-
volved shoring up the public image of the legal profession.67 The
profession had been criticized for being exclusively client-centered
and motivated by an overly partisan ethos. 68 The public image of
the profession had also suffered a severe blow because of the num-
ber of lawyers implicated in the Watergate scandal. 69
60. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1981).
61. FREEDMAN, supra note 48, at 95.
62. Id. at 87-108.
63. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 180-81.
64. FREEDMAN, supra note 48, at 100.
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R_ 1.6(b) (1998) (amended 2002). The
Rule also allows for disclosure when the lawyer is defending or bringing possible legal
or ethical claims. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2),(3) (1998) (amended
2002). This note does not discuss the other limited situations in which the ABA allows
disclosure of client information.
66. Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics, in LAwYERs' IDEALS/ LAWYERS'
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 95, 104 (Robert L.
Nelson, David M. Trubek, & Rayman L. Solomon, eds., 1992).
67. Id.
68. FREEDMAN, supra note 48, at 96.
69. Schneyer, supra note 66, at 104.
20031
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The second goal was to solidify the role of the ABA as the pri-
mary promulgator of ethical standards for the profession. 70 The pri-
macy of the ABA was threatened because of Supreme Court
decisions rejecting some of the ABA rules. 7 1 While many states had
readily adopted the Code, state courts were not as responsive when it
came to adopting the ABA's amendments or the opinions constru-
ing the Code.72 One controversial issue that the ABA wanted to ad-
dress was the whistle-blowing requirement that the SEC read into
the ABA rule that governed a lawyer's conduct when a client en-
gaged in fraud.
73
The whistle-blowing requirement was directly relevant to the
duty of confidentiality. The Code's DR 7-102(B) (1) called on a law-
yer to "reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal" when the
lawyer's services had been used to perpetrate the fraud.7 4 In 1972,
the Securities Exchange Commission used this disciplinary rule to
strengthen the case against two prominent law firms that had
learned of fraud during a merger deal and failed to notify the
shareholders. 75 The ABA responded by amending the Code to make
it clear that the disclosure requirement was subordinate to the law-
yer's duty of confidentiality and later construed the amendment to
remove any disclosure duty.7 6 Unfortunately, many states never
adopted the amendment.
77
The twin goals of the Kutak Commission are symptomatic of
the confidentiality debate as a whole. The profession was trying, on
the one hand, to refute criticisms that lawyers were overly partisan,
while on the other, still preserving the lawyer's and client's interests
70. Id.
71. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (narrowing the scope of per-
missible limitations on lawyer advertising on First Amendment grounds); Goldfarb v.
Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (banning the enforcement of local minimum fee
schedules on antitrust grounds).
72. Schneyer, supra note 66, at 104.
73. Id. at 105.
74. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILiTy DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969) (amended
1974).
75. SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, (D.D.C. 1978); see also
Schneyer, supra note 66, at 105.




in not requiring whistle-blowing.78 Ultimately, the Kutak Commis-
sion turned out to be a more reform-minded commission than was
originally expected.7 9 Its original proposal included changes that
would allow attorneys to disclose client information to prevent "sub-
stantial injury to the financial interest or property of another" and
that would require attorneys to disclose perjury to the tribunal.8 0
The House of Delegates accepted the proposed change that would
require attorneys to inform the court if their clients committed
fraud on the court.81 However, the House rejected the provision
that would allow disclosure to prevent economic harm in favor of a
narrower rule that allowed for disclosure only to prevent physical
harm resulting from a crime.8 2
In its final form, Rule 1.6 provided minimal opportunities for
lawyers to disclose client misconduct. The relevant part of Rule 1.6
reads as follows: "A lawyer may reveal such information to the ex-
tent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the cli-
ent from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely
to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."8 3
Rule 1.6, for example, would not allow a lawyer concerned
about the effects of toxic dumping to disclose dumping by his cor-
porate client. For one, toxic dumping might not be a crime, one of
the conditions necessary to make disclosure permissible. Even as-
suming that the dumping was criminal, the lawyer would also need
to prove that the harm was "imminent." Therefore, a lawyer would
most likely be forced to remain silent in this situation.
The Rule also required silence when dealing with an individual
client capable of committing a crime that was not going to cause
"imminent bodily harm, or death"8 4 or if the crime had already
been committed. An example of this would be a client who has put
poison in the water supply of a city. Because the crime has already
been committed the lawyer is compelled to remain silent.
78. Id. The ABA was particularly responsive to the concerns of the elite corporate
bar.
79. Schneyer, supra note 66, at 107-113.
80. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (Discussion Draft Jan. 30, 1980).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)4 (2002).
82. FREEDMAN, supra note 48, at 99.
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1998) (amended 2002).
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (1998) (amended 2002).
20031
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Although the ABA rejected the proposed suggestion, the prob-
lem of preventing economic injury was addressed again a year later
when the ABA adopted the Comments to the Model Rules.85 The
Comments to Rule 1.6 require a lawyer to withdraw from represent-
ing a client if "the lawyer's services will be used by the client in
materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct. '86
The Comments further allow an attorney to give "notice of the fact
of withdrawal" and "withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document,
affirmation, or the like."8 7 Such a noisy withdrawal can serve to
warn third parties of harm, without direct disclosure by the attor-
ney.8 8 These Comments allowed attorneys to "wave a red flag"89
about issues they were previously prohibited from disclosing.90
The noisy withdrawal option provided for in the Comments
was an unsatisfactory attempt to reach a balance between the duty
of confidentiality and the competing concerns. The Comment
clearly contradicts the text of the Rule. Also by being placed in the
Comments, which merely serves as a guide to interpretation, the
noisy withdrawal provision has little credence. As a consequence,
lawyers are likely to be apprehensive about using the noisy with-
drawal provision.
Although the Model Rules generally reflected a growing recog-
nition of the traditional justifications for confidentiality, the under-
lying problems remained. The balance between the competing
concern of harm to third parties and the duty of confidentiality was
not satisfactorily achieved under the Model Rules.
III. ETHICS 2000
The creation of the Ethics 2000 Commission was prompted by
continuous attacks on the current Rule 1.6.91 As the Commission
noted, the current rule was "out of step with public policy and the
85. FREEDMAN supra note 48, at 100.
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (1998) (amended 2002).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (1998) (amended 2002).
88. See FREEDMAN, supra note 48, at 100-01.
89. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Rules of Professional
Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 ORE. L. REv. 455 (1984).
90. See FREEDMAN, supra note 48, at 100-01.
91. ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, ABA, Creation of the Commission: Executive Summary, at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-execsumm.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (on file
with the New York Law School Law Review).
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values of the legal profession as reflected in the rules currently in
force in most jurisdictions."92 The version of Rule 1.6 in the Model
Rules was not followed in the majority ofjurisdictions.93 Most juris-
dictions permitted disclosure in much broader circumstances in-
volving client crime. 94  Some jurisdictions even mandated
disclosure. 95 The state rules also varied as to when a lawyer could
disclose a client's intent to commit future economic crimes. 96 The
Commission sought to reconcile the differences by bringing the
Model Rules closer to the rules that are instituted in numerous
jurisdictions.
97
The controversy over the extent of the duty of confidentiality
was ignited again in August 2001 when the ABA approved some,
but not all, of the proposed changes to Rule 1.6.98 The Ethics 2000
Commission sought to resolve some of the underlying problems
with the duty of confidentiality. This included more expansive ex-
ceptions to the duty of confidentiality. 99 The Commission's propo-
sal was an attempt to make disclosure permissible under
circumstances where it believed society's interests outweighed the
benefit of confidentiality: "While strongly reaffirming the legal pro-
fession's commitment to the core value of confidentiality, the Com-
mission also recognizes the overriding importance of human life
and the integrity of the lawyer's own role within the legal
system."100
92. Id
93. Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Chart of Ethics Rules on Client Confi-
dences, reprinted in 2001 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, at 136-
144 (Foundation Press, 2001). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAwYERs §67 (1998).
94. Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Chart of Ethics Rules on Client Confi-
dences, reprinted in 2001 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, at 136-
146 (Foundation Press, 2001).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, ABA, Model Rule 1. 6:Reporter's Explanation of Changes,
at http://abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel6rem.html (last visited )ct. 24, 2003).
98. Al Swanson, ABA Ethics Debate Stalls, UNITED PRESS INT'L, August 7, 2001.
99. Id.
100. ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, ABA, Model Rule 1.6. Reporter's Explanation of Changes,
at http://abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel6rem.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
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A. The Proposals
The Commission's proposals were as expansive as the changes
that were previously proposed by the Kutak Commission. The pro-
posed changes permitted disclosure of client information to pre-
vent both physical and economic harms. 101
The proposed exception for prevention of physical harm per-
mitted a lawyer much broader freedom to disclose. The proposal
changed the wording to allow disclosure to "prevent reasonably cer-
tain death or substantial bodily harm."10 2 This change removed the
requirement that a client's actions had to be criminal. It also al-
lowed the lawyer to disclose past client actions provided that the
resulting death or substantial bodily harm occurred in the fu-
ture.103 The rule also eliminated the requirement that the death or
bodily harm be "imminent," now requiring that it be "reasonably
certain" death or bodily harm. 10 4 The new rule allowed attorneys
to disclose information about a client's conduct, future or past, and
irrespective of whether it was criminal to the extent the lawyer be-
lieved death or substantially injury were "reasonably certain. '1 0
5
This represented a substantial departure from the extremely nar-
row exception within the old Rule 1.6.106
Ethics 2000 also proposed exceptions to the duty that would
permit disclosure in circumstances in which there was a serious risk
of potential financial harm to third parties. This represented a dras-
tic change from the text of the then-current rule that did not allow
an exception for financial harms.'0 7 The proposal allowed for dis-
closure to prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud when
a lawyer's services were being used or had been used in that crime
or fraud.10 8 They also proposed allowing a lawyer to disclose "to






106. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1998) (amended 2002).
107. Id. This is not addressing the noisy withdrawal permitted in the Comments of
the old Rule 1.6, discussed infra Section 2.B.
108. ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, ABA, Model Rule 1.6:Reporter's Explanation of Changes,
at http://abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel6rem.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
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ests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud" which
the client used the lawyer's services for. 10 9
B. The New Rule
When the ABA voted on the Ethics 2000 Commission's recom-
mendations, it split on the different proposals. 10 The physical
harm exception was approved without much opposition in the
House of Delegates. 1 ' The economic harm provision, however,
was overwhelmingly rejected by a 255 to 151 vote. 112
As mentioned above, the physical harm exception represented
a marked change from the old rule. In the situation of a lawyer
representing a company dumping toxic waste, a lawyer has more
discretion under the newly adopted rule. The lawyer can disclose
regardless of whether the dumping was criminal or accidental." 3 It
is also no longer necessary that the lawyer show that harm will be
"imminent,"114 just "reasonably certain,"'115 which is a lesser stan-
dard. Therefore, a lawyer would be able to disclose in such a situa-
tion, and it is clearly a situation that the Ethics 2000 Commission
had in mind.
The Rule would also allow disclosure when dealing with an in-
dividual client who has committed a crime. For example, in the
situation of a client who has put poison in the water supply of a city,
a lawyer would be allowed to disclose to prevent the future harm to
the users of the water supply. The lawyer would no longer be hin-
dered by the fact that the client has already committed the crime
and, therefore, prevention of the crime is not possible. The em-
phasis of the Rule has switched from client centered, preventing
the client from committing the crime, to trying to prevent physical
harm to third parties.
Overall, the ABA's recognition of a broad duty with a narrow
exception to disclose client information to prevent physical harm
109. Id.
110. Al Swanson, ABA Ethics Debate Stalls, UNITED PRESS INT'L, August 7, 2001.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. This situation is taken from Comment 6 to the new Rule 1.6.
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 1.6(b) (1998) (amended 2002).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002).
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represents its commitment to preserving the duty and serving the
traditional justifications for confidentiality. By having a narrowly
tailored exception to the duty of confidentiality, the ABA acknowl-
edged the importance of competing concerns. However, when it
comes to economic harm from corporate conduct the ABA should
adopt a much broader exception to the duty, because the tradi-
tional justifications have less weight in the corporate context.
IV. THE CORPORATE/INDIVDUAL CLIENT DISTINCTION
A. The Inapplicability of the Traditional Justifications in the
Corporate Context
The ABA can better serve the traditional justifications for the
duty of confidentiality by adopting a rule that would distinguish be-
tween corporate and individual clients. This section will demon-
strate that the traditional justifications do not establish a need for a
strong duty of confidentiality in the corporate setting. Accordingly,
the competing concern for economic harm to third parties result-
ing from illegal or fraudulent conduct, which is not given weight in
the individual context, should be given weight in the corporate
context.
In the individual client context, the justifications for confiden-
tiality are very strong and the duty should be vigorously pre-
served. 116 However, avoiding death or serious physical harm is
society's most basic public interest. Therefore, Ethics 2000's deci-
sion to allow disclosure to prevent death or serious physical harm
was warranted, despite confidentiality concerns.
In contrast, the traditional justifications are not as forceful in
the context of corporate representation. Corporations are entities
that allow investors to do business with limited liability; in exchange
for this status, corporations are forced to comply with strict legal
requirements."17 These requirements begin with the compliance
116. There seems to be a rationale to distinguish between individual clients in a
criminal context and in the civil context. The traditional justifications are stronger in
the criminal context. This note does not address this option, because there are practical
limitations on making this distinction. In any given circumstance, a lawyer would not
know if a client was going to face criminal charges.
117. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS, 145-46,




with state incorporation statutes that lay out the detailed rules for
the creation of a corporation. 118 Incorporation statutes have guide-
lines for the simplest of matters, such as corporate names, to the
most complex and determinative matters, such as defining the
rights that will go along with stock.' 19 As entities within the Ameri-
can market system, corporations are supposed to aim for trans-
parency and accountability to ensure knowledgeable decision-
making by the investing public. 120 This aim is pursued by having
statutes that call for disclosure of information regarding numerous
aspects of corporations' inner workings. For example, when a cor-
poration sells its stock, the Securities Act of 1933 requires that the
securities be registered with the SEC, and that substantial disclo-
sures are made during this process. 121 The 1933 Act further re-
quires that a prospectus be furnished to every person or entity that
buys the stock.122 Additionally, corporations must file various an-
nual reports, which are reviewed by the SEC and made available to
the public. 123 Based on these requirements and the unique status
of corporations, the traditional justifications for the duty of confi-
dentiality are not as forceful.
124
The argument for confidentiality, as an instrumental part of
the adversarial system, is not persuasive in the corporate setting.
125
Due to corporations' special status, confidentiality is not necessary
to facilitate a free flow of information from the client to the law-
yer. 126 Many governing agencies impose disclosure requirements
on corporations, thereby forcing the corporation to keep up an
ongoing dialogue with its lawyers. 127 Unlike an individual client,
118. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 117, at 12, n. 3.
119. DEL. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 102 (1995); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 402 (McKinney
Supp. 1997).
120. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 117, at 34.
121. 15 U.S.C. §77(e) (1982).
122. 17 C.F.R. 230.174 (2001).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1), (m) (1982).
124. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 206-233.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Banking and SEC requirements require a corporation to make various public
disclosures. See 12 C.F.R. 563.17-C (1988); see also, James R. Doty, The Attorney-Client
Relationship in a Regulated Society: SEC Enforcement Actions Against Lauyers: The Next Phase,
35 S. TEX. L. REV. 585 (1994).
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corporations are often forced to talk to their attorneys, at least to
provide information for regulatory filings.
Loyalty within this field is also limited by the disclosure re-
quirements from other areas of law. 128 There are regulations that
force lawyers to compel their clients' compliance with regula-
tions.' 29 Lawyers also face professional risks for failure to disclose
corporate clients' misdeeds, such as suspension from practice in
front of the SEC.' 30 Failure to comply can also result in criminal
liability for the lawyer in certain circumstances.
131
Related to the lawyer's duty of loyalty is the argument for pre-
serving confidentiality to protect the human dignities of the client.
It could be argued that the human dignities that belong to the indi-
viduals who make up a corporation justify the duty of confidential-
ity to the corporation. 13 2  However, it remains that if the
corporation is the client, the individuals' rights and dignities are
not protected by the duty.
1 33
The protection of constitutional rights is also not a concern
when dealing with the corporate client. Corporations do not have a
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 34 This right is a
"purely personal right" and may not be asserted to avoid incriminat-
ing a third party. 135 Therefore, an agent may not assert the right to
protect the principle. 136 Since the corporation lacks a Fifth
Amendment right, allowing disclosure by lawyers would not, as in
128. See generally 17 C.F.R. 201.102 (2002) (SEC, RULES OF PRACTICE).
129. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, §7.15 (4th ed.
2002).
130. See 17 C.F.R. 201.102(e). See also HAZEN, supra note 129, at 393 ("the SEC can
discipline attorneys under SEC Rule of Practice 2(e) which provides that the Commis-
sion may suspend, limit or bar 'any person' from practicing before it 'in any way'." ).
131. In re Carter & Johnson, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-17597 (Feb. 28, 1981)
(holding that in order to establish aider and abettor liability, it must be shown that the
attorney was a substantial participant and acted with the requisite scienter).
132. See id.
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) (2002) (requiring a lawyer to
explain who the client is when dealing with employees of a corporation when the em-
ployees' interests are adverse to the corporation.)
134. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); see also Note, Constitutional Rights of the
Corporate Person, supra note 117.
135. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1906)
136. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50. This decision became part of the "collective entity"
doctrine which denies the right against self-incrimination to corporations, labor unions
and partnerships. See also DRESSLER, supra note 35,
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the context of individual clients, nullify the constitutionally co-min-
gled rights of effective assistance of counsel and right against self-
incrimination. 137 Therefore, constitutional protections do not jus-
tify a duty of confidentiality.
Once it is established that the traditional justifications do not
require a strict duty of confidentiality for corporate clients, the next
issue is which competing concerns are to be recognized in these
circumstances. As noted above, the traditional justifications for the
duty are very strong in the individual client context. The concerns
of possible economic harm are not strong enough to justify weaken-
ing a basic principle of the attorney client relationship.
In the corporate client context, the ABA should take a differ-
ent approach. The ABA should pursue an approach that allows at-
torneys to disclose illegal or fraudulent actions of their corporate
clients that will likely cause substantial economic harm.
138
The Enron debacle is an example of where allowing an attor-
ney to disclose could have prevented economic harm to
thousands.13 9 Assuming an attorney was aware of the off-balance-
sheet entities Enron was involved in, under Rule 1.13, Organization
as Client, it would have been appropriate for the lawyer to bring
concerns up the corporate ladder, even to the point of bringing the
issue to the board of directors. 140 After having exhausted the cor-
porate procedure, if the board did not take appropriate remedial
137. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 217-20.
138. Corporations are precluded from having illegal interests because acting on
those interests, as ultra vires, would not be a legitimate action of the corporation. Some
Commentators have argued that "confidentiality interests of a corporate client are not
infringed by lawyer disclosure under the circumstances required by the paragraph, as
the paragraph addresses a situation where the lawyer reasonably believes that agents of
an issuer are engaged in serious illegality that the issuer has failed to remedy; in that
situation, an instruction by an officer or even the board of the issuer to remain silent
cannot be regarded as authorized." Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Profes-
sional Conduct for Attorneys, [Release Nos. 33-8185; 34-47276; IC-25919; File No. S7-45-
02] RIN 3235-AI72
"Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys" (citing the com-
ments of William H. Simon, at 3). The regulations implemented to Sarbanes-Oxley are
discussed further infra Section IV.B.
139. See Richard A. Oppel, Employees' Retirement Plan Is a Victim as Enron Tumbles,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al.
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13(b) (3) (2002).
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measures, the lawyer should be allowed to go outside the
corporation.
B. The Current Opportunity to Modify the Duty of Confidentiality to be
Consistent with National Standards
The ABA's role in promulgating ethical standards would be un-
dercut by not appropriately responding to the current concerns in-
volving lawyers' roles in corporate scandals. By adopting an
exception to permit disclosure for economic harm in the corporate
context, the ABA will be able to reassert its authority as the promul-
gator of ethical rules. Three policy-influencing bodies- the ABA
Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Congress, and the Chief
Justices Conference- have all responded to current concerns by
supporting proposals similar to that of Ethics 2000. A distinction
between corporate clients and individual clients would be consis-
tent with the proposals these bodies have supported and would
help achieve the related goals of protecting the investing public,
while maintaining the basic tenets of the legal profession where
they are at their strongest.
The ABA began its response to recent corporate scandals by
convening the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility in March of
2002.14' The task force not only recommended accepting the pro-
posed exception to prevent economic harm that was presented by
Ethics 2000, but also recommended that the ABA make the disclo-
sure mandatory, rather than permissive.
142
Congress responded to the apparent role of lawyers in the cor-
porate scandals by passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which empowers
the SEC to promulgate regulations to set "forth minimum stan-
dards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practic-
ing before the Commission in any way."'1 43 Section 307 also requires
lawyers to bring concerns of material violations of securities law to
141. James H. Cheek, ABA, Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task
Force on Corporate Responsibility, July 16, 2002, 58 Bus. LAw. 189 (2002).
142. Id. at 205.
143. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §307, 15 U.S.C. §7201 (2002). Section 307 also
explicitly required that the SEC furnish a regulation, which will mandate an up-the-
ladder reporting requirement when a lawyer reasonably believes a material violation of
securities laws has occurred. This up-the-ladder reporting requirement includes al-
lowing the attorney to go to the board of directors.
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upper level members of the corporation and to the board of direc-
tor-, if necessary. Section 307 gives the SEC a clear statutory man-
date to put rules into effect to govern the practice of lawyers before
it: "remov[ing] the legal cloud that has long surrounded Rule
102(e), promulgated by the SEC to discipline securities lawyers and
accountants."1 4 4 Section 307 is also limited to governing lawyers'
representing issuers, and it "does not call for the SEC to adopt any
rules for lawyers representing individuals."
145
The SEC regulations, issued pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, have added more force to the argument that disclosure should
be allowed to prevent substantial economic harm resulting from il-
legal or fraudulent conduct of a corporate client. Provision (d) (2)
of Regulation 205.3 states that:
(2) An attorney appearing and practicing before the
Commission in the representation of an issuer may reveal
to the Commission, without the issuer's consent, confi-
dential information related to the representation to the
extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material
violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors;
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material viola-
tion by the issuer that caused, or may cause, substan-
tial injury to the financial interest or property of the
issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the at-
torney's services were used.
This provision makes disclosure permissible in the context of secur-
ities filings with the SEC that Ethics 2000 had proposed in the gen-
eral context. As past events have demonstrated, this is certainly an
area where the level and immense risk of substantial financial losses
warrants having such an exception. Additionally, the SEC states
144. Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical
Issues, 58 Bus. LAW. 143, 183 (2002).
145. Larry P. Scriggins, Legal Ethics, Confidentiality, and the Organizational Client, 58
Bus LAw. 123, 134 (2002).
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that these rules are permissive, and are meant to supplement state
ethics rules, not preempt them.
1 46
Since the authority to issue and enforce binding ethics rules
lies with the state bar authorities, a short evaluation of how jurisdic-
tions have responded to current concerns and events is relevant to
this discussion. It is clear that the majority of jurisdictions have de-
parted from the ABA standard of requiring strict confidentiality:
"[A] significant majority of the state ethics codes have, in the past
twenty years, adopted standards containing some version of permis-
sive or mandatory disclosure of criminal or fraudulent activity hav-
ing material economic consequences for another person."147 In
addition, the Conference of Chief Justices has adopted a resolution
endorsing the Ethics 2000 recommendations involving the excep-
tions for prevention of economic harm. 48 The resolution acknowl-
edges that its intent is to address concerns "in light of the
unexpected and traumatic failures [in] recent months of several
large corporations." 149 Therefore, if the ABA drew a distinction be-
tween corporate and individual clients the new rule would be con-
sistent with the Conference of Chief Justices' aims, who are already
likely to make Ethics 2000's recommendations binding in most
states.
Before the ABA follows through with the Task Force's recom-
mendations, it would be more efficient to distinguish between cor-
porate and individual clients. This distinction would allow the ABA
to address the current concerns while still preserving the duty in
the individual context, where it is most forcefully justified.
146. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §205.1 ("These standards supplement applicable
standards of any jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices and are not
intended to limit the ability of any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an
attorney not inconsistent with the application of this part.").
147. Scriggins, supra note 145, at 128. Forty-one jurisdictions either require or per-
mit disclosure to prevent a client from perpetrating a fraud that constitutes a crime;
thirty-seven permit disclosure and four require it. Eighteen jurisdictions permit or re-
quire disclosure to rectify substantial financial loss resulting from a client's prior com-
mission of a crime or fraud in which the client used the lawyer's services. Of these
eighteen jurisdictions, sixteen permit and two require disclosure. Id. at 128.
148. Conference of ChiefJustices, Policy Statements & Resolutions Res. 35 (Aug. 1,
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V. CONCLUSION
This note has examined the changes to the duty of confidenti-
ality made by the Ethics 2000 Commission. The analysis involved
evaluating the traditional justifications for the duty of confidential-
ity in the individual and corporate client context. The traditional
justifications for the duty do not warrant a stringent standard of
confidentiality for corporate-clients. In reconsidering the issue of
confidentiality, the ABA should make a distinction between corpo-
rate and individual clients and permit disclosure of client informa-
tion to prevent substantial economic harm from a corporate client's
illegal or fraudulent conduct.

